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DOES CHAPTER 11 SAVE ECONOMICALLY
INEFFICIENT FIRMS?
MICHELLE J. WHITE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has two separate bankruptcy procedures: Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code is a procedure for liquidating failing firms, while
Chapter 11 is a procedure for reorganizing failing firms. From an
economic standpoint, the justification for having two separate bankruptcy
procedures is that there are two different types of firms in bankruptcy:
those that are economically inefficient in the sense that their resources
would be more valuable in some alternate use, and those that are economi-
cally efficient despite their financial distress since their resources have no
higher value use. Economically inefficient failing firms should be
liquidated, freeing their resources to be allocated to higher value uses,
while economically efficient but failing firms should be saved. However,
in practice it is difficult to identify which firms fall into which category.
As a result, U.S. bankruptcy procedures may operate with error: Type I
error occurs if economically inefficient firms are saved in Chapter 11, while
Type II error occurs if economically efficient firms are shut down under
Chapter 7.V Two recent surveys of small and medium-size firms in
Chapter 11 find that only one-sixth to one-quarter succeed in adopting a
reorganization plan and remain in operation.2 And two surveys of large
* Professor of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 48109-1220. I am grateful to
Daniel Ingberman and Alan Schwartz for helpful comments. I received research support from the
Center for the Study of the Economy and the State at the University of Chicago, where I was a visitor
while writing this paper.
I. See Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganiza-
tions and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION (forthcoming 1994)
[hereinafter White, Corporate Bankruptcy], for a discussion of the characteristics of efficient versus
inefficient firms. See also Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European
Comparison, in BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Jagdeep S. Bhandari ed.,
forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter White, Comparison] (discussing the costs of type I and type II error in
bankruptcy).
2. See Susan Jensen-Cocklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a
Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297 (1992); Edward Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter
II (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, unpublished study, 1989).
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public firms in Chapter 11 find that, although these firms are very likely
to adopt reorganization plans, about one-third of them either file under
Chapter 11 a second time or undergo a private restructuring within a few
years after emerging from Chapter 11.' This suggests that Type I
bankruptcy error in particular is an important problem: many of the firms
that file under Chapter 11 may fail to reorganize, or may reorganize but
continue to experience financial difficulties, because they are economically
inefficient and should not have been in Chapter 11 in the first place.
This paper presents a game theoretic model that explains why Type I
error may occur in bankruptcy.4 In the model, there are two types of
failing firms: efficient and inefficient. Managers are assumed to know
whether their firms are efficient or inefficient, but creditors and bankruptcy
court officials are assumed not to possess this knowledge. Managers of
failing firms are assumed to choose between filing for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 or filing under Chapter 11. Two types of equilibria may occur.
The first is the ideal outcome in bankruptcy: all efficient but failing firms
file under Chapter 11 and all inefficient failing firms file under Chapter 7.
This equilibrium is referred to as a "perfect filtering" equilibrium, since the
bankruptcy system acts as a perfect filter in distinguishing between the two
types of failing firms even though creditors and other outsiders cannot tell
them apart.
Under the second type of equilibrium, all efficient failing firms file under
Chapter 11, but some or all of the inefficient failing firms also file under
Chapter 11. This type of outcome is referred to as a "filtering failure"
equilibrium since the bankruptcy system fails to distinguish between
inefficient and efficient failing firms. As a result, some or all inefficient
firms succeed in reorganizing in bankruptcy, which wastes resources by
retaining assets in inefficient uses. Filtering failure may occur because
managers of efficient firms benefit from making their firms appear less
efficient than they actually are and because managers of inefficient firms
benefit from making their firms appear more efficient than they actually
are. Efficient firms benefit from appearing to be less efficient since this
allows them to pay less to creditors under the reorganization plan;
inefficient firms benefit from appearing to be more efficient since this
allows them to obtain the benefits of reorganizing. Thus, the model
3. See Edith S. Hotchkiss, The Post-Bankruptcy Performance of Firms Emerging from Chapter
11, 50 J. FIN. (forthcoming 1995); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993).
4. The model does not allow for Type II error-i.e., efficient firms liquidating in bankruptcy.
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suggests an explanation for why Chapter 11 works badly and why firms
that file under it often fail in their attempts to reorganize: many of these
firms are economically inefficient and should liquidate.
Part II describes the model and illustrates it with an example. Part III
presents a simulation of the model which explores whether filtering failure
is likely to be a problem in practice. Using values taken from recent
empirical research on bankruptcy, the simulation suggests that filtering
failure is likely to occur. Part IV concludes
II. THE MODEL
The model is shown in Figure 1. At the top, a chance event determines
whether failing firms are efficient or inefficient, where all firms of each
type are assumed to be identical. The proportion of failing firms that are
economically efficient is 0.4 and the proportion that are economically
inefficient is 0.6. The top left node shows the choice faced by managers
of efficient firms. I assume that they always file under Chapter 11 rather
than Chapter 7, because under Chapter 11 they remain in control of a
potentially viable firm, while under Chapter 7 the firm is liquidated and
they lose their jobs.
Once in Chapter 11, managers of efficient firms are assumed to choose
between offering reorganization plans which involve paying either a high
or a low amount to creditors. Under the high payment reorganization plan,
creditors receive an amount which they would be willing to accept in
bargaining over a Chapter 11 reorganization plan if they knew that the firm
was economically efficient. Under the low payment reorganization plan,
creditors receive less. The top right node shows the choice faced by
managers of inefficient firms. One possibility is that they file under
Chapter 11 and offer a reorganization plan that pays creditors the same low
5. There are several other papers that use the assumption of imperfect information to explore
aspects of the bankruptcy process, but they focus on other questions. Ronald M. Giammarino, in The
Resolution of Financial Distress, 2 REV. FIN. STUD. 25 (1989), examines why firms rationally may
choose to incur high bankruptcy costs, and Robert Gertner and Randal C. Picker, in Bankruptcy and
the Allocation of Control (University of Chicago Working Paper, 1992) (on file with author), examine
the efficiency of investment incentives by managers of firms in bankruptcy. There are also several
game theory models of bankruptcy which focus on how the value of the firm in reorganization is
divided between managers and creditors. See David T. Brown, Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in
Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law, 2 REV. FIN. STUD. 109 (1989); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Howard Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 253 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON.
595 (1992).
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payment amount offered by managers of efficient firms. Alternately,
managers may avoid bankruptcy as long as possible, use up the firm's
assets, and file eventually to liquidate under Chapter 7. A third possibility
(not shown in Figure 1) is that managers of inefficient firms file under
Chapter 11 and offer a reorganization plan that pays creditors the same
high payment amount that managers of efficient firms offer. I assume that
this alternative is never chosen because the high payment amount is high
enough to make managers of inefficient firms prefer to avoid bankruptcy
as long as possible and eventually liquidate under Chapter 7.
An Example of Filtering Failure in Bankruptcy
Ch.11
(4,1.9) (2,1.9)
Figure 1
Creditors are all assumed to be identical. They know the characteristics
of both efficient and inefficient failing firms and the overall probability that
[VOL. 72:1319
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failing firms are efficient, but they cannot determine whether individual
firms are efficient or inefficient. Now suppose that managers offer high
payment reorganization plans. Since only managers of efficient firms offer
high payment plans, creditors learn that any firm offering a high payment
plan is efficient. And since creditors were assumed willing to accept the
high payment amount if they knew that the firm making the offer was
efficient, they always accept these plans.
Now assume that managers offer low payment reorganization plans.
Then creditors must decide whether to accept or reject without knowing
whether the firm is efficient or inefficient. Their decision is shown by the
two central nodes in Figure 1 which are connected by a dashed line. If
creditors accept low payment plans, then the plans go into effect and the
game ends. If creditors reject low payment plans, then I assume that a
trustee is appointed, managers are displaced, and firms are offered for sale
on the open market.
The process of selling firms on the open market is assumed to reveal
individual firms' types. If a firm is inefficient, then it sells for a low price
and the proceeds, net of transactions costs, are paid to creditors. If a firm
is efficient, then either it may be sold or a creditor may offer a second
reorganization plan which is accepted. In either case, creditors receive a
higher amount. Finally, if managers of inefficient firms file under Chapter
7, then creditors learn that the firm is inefficient, but they have no decision
to make.
Figure 1 shows the payoffs to managers and creditors, respectively, in
parentheses at each terminal node in the game. Consider managers of
efficient firms first. They receive 3 with certainty if they offer high
payment plans, but they gamble if they offer low payment plans since they
receive 4 if creditors accept but only 2 if creditors reject. Therefore, the
best outcome for managers of efficient firms is to offer low payment plans
which creditors accept; their worst outcome is to offer low payment plans
which creditors reject; and their intermediate outcome is to offer high
payment plans (which creditors always accept). If managers offer either
low or high payment plans and creditors accept, then managers are assumed
to remain in control of their firms. But if managers offer low payment
plans and creditors reject, then managers are displaced.
Now consider managers of inefficient firms. They receive 1 with
certainty if they choose Chapter 7, but they gamble if they offer low
payment plans, since they receive 2 if creditors accept but only 0.5 if
creditors reject. These figures imply that the best outcome for managers
of inefficient firms is to offer low payment Chapter 11 plans which
1323
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creditors accept; their worst outcome is to offer low payment plans which
creditors reject; and their intermediate outcome is to avoid filing for
bankruptcy as long as possible and to file eventually under Chapter 7.
Filing under Chapter 11 and offering a low payment plan which creditors
accept is good for managers, because they benefit from debt forgiveness
and other subsidies in Chapter 11 and they remain, at least temporarily, in
control of the firm. (Since the firm is inefficient, it is likely to fail
eventually despite benefitting from Chapter 11.) Managers' intermediate
outcome is to remain outside of bankruptcy and file eventually under
Chapter 7, because they remain in control of the firm even though it does
not receive the benefits of Chapter 11. Offering a low payment plan in
Chapter 11 that creditors reject is the worst outcome for managers because
they are displaced as soon as the plan is rejected.6
Finally, consider the position of creditors. If managers of inefficient
firms liquidate under Chapter 7, then creditors' payoff is 1. If managers
of efficient firms offer high payment plans, then creditors receive 3-the
high payment amount. If managers offer low payment plans, then creditors
receive a sure payoff of 1.9-the low payment amount-if they accept.
But creditors gamble if they reject the plans, since they receive 3 if the
firm turns out to be efficient but only 1 if the firm turns out to be
inefficient. When creditors are offered a low payment plan, their best
outcome occurs if they reject the plan and the firm turns out to be efficient;
their worst outcome occurs if they reject the plan and the firm turns out to
be inefficient. This follows from the assumption that when creditors reject
low payment plans, managers are displaced, and firms are offered for sale
on the open market. Through this process, individual firms' types are
revealed. Since efficient firms' assets are more valuable than inefficient
firms' assets, creditors receive more when their firms turn out to be
efficient. Creditors' intermediate outcome occurs if they accept low
payment plans, which will occur only if the low payment amount is
between 1 and 37 The low payment amount must be greater than 1 or
else creditors would never accept low payment plans, and must be less than
6. Arguably, managers of inefficient firms are better off filing under Chapter I I than remaining
outside of bankruptcy and filing eventually under Chapter 7, even if their reorganization plans are
rejected by creditors. The argument is that managers can delay offering their reorganization plans by
obtaining extensions of the exclusivity period from the bankruptcy judge. Consequently, they can
remain in control of the firm longer by filing under Chapter 11 than by avoiding bankruptcy as long
as possible. If this were true, then filtering failure would always occur in bankruptcy.
7. Although the low payment amount is set equal to 1.9 in the example, it is endogenously
determined by the model discussed below.
[VOL. 72:1319
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/34
1994] ECONOMICALLY INEFFICIENT FIRMS IN CHAPTER 11
3 or else creditors would never reject low payment plans.
Now turn to the solution of the model. Consider creditors' decision
when managers offer low payment reorganization plans. Since the
probability that failing firms are efficient equals 0.4, creditors' expected
return if they reject low payment plans is 0.4(3) + 0.6(1), or 1.8.8
Creditors therefore prefer to accept low payment plans, since their sure
payoff if they accept, 1.9, exceeds their expected return if they reject.
However, because creditors always accept low payment plans, managers
always offer them. Managers of inefficient firms receive a payoff of 2 if
they offer low payment plans and creditors accept, compared to a payoff
of only 1 if they file under Chapter 7. Managers of efficient firms receive
a payoff of 4 if they offer low payment plans and creditors accept,
compared to a payoff of only 3 if they offer high payment plans.
Therefore, if creditors always accept low payment Chapter 11 plans, then
all managers of failing firms file under Chapter 11 and offer these plans.
This type of equilibrium is called a pooling equilibrium because the
result of the game is that the firms' type is not revealed. In the bankruptcy
context, I refer to this type of equilibrium as a filtering failure equilibrium.
It is economically inefficient since all inefficient failing firms file under
Chapter 11 and successfully reorganize, when they should liquidate under
Chapter 7. The equilibrium occurs because managers of both types of
failing firm benefit when creditors cannot distinguish between them:
managers of efficient firms benefit because creditors accept a lower
payment in reorganization than they would be willing to accept if they
knew that the firm were efficient, and managers of inefficient firms benefit
because they are able to reorganize rather than being forced to liquidate.9
However, if we change the example in Figure 1 slightly, then a different
type of equilibrium occurs. Suppose the probability that failing firms are
efficient rises from 0.4 to 0.6. Now creditors' expected return if they reject
low payment plans is 0.6(3) + 0.4(1), or 2.2. Since this is greater than
their payoff of 1.9 if they accept low payment plans, they always reject.
Therefore, it is never in managers' interest to offer these plans. Managers
of inefficient firms receive a payoff of 1 if they file under Chapter 7,
compared to a payoff of only 0.5 if they offer low payment plans under
Chapter 11 which creditors reject. Managers of efficient firms receive a
S. All parties are assumed to be risk neutral.
9. A pooling equilibrium occurs in the example as long as the low payment amount takes a value
greater than 1.8 and less than 2. See infra note 15 for the derivation of the condition that the low
payment amount must be less than 2.
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payoff of 3 if they offer a high payment plan under Chapter 11, compared
to a payoff of only 2 if they offer a low payment plan under Chapter 11
which creditors reject. Therefore, all managers of efficient failing firms
offer high payment plans under Chapter 11 and all managers of inefficient
failing firms file under Chapter 7. This type of equilibrium is called a
separating equilibrium, because the result of the game is that managers of
the two types of firms choose different strategies and, therefore, reveal their
firms' type. In the bankruptcy context, I refer to this type of equilibrium
as a perfect filtering equilibrium. This type of equilibrium is the best that
can occur in bankruptcy, since all inefficient failing firms liquidate under
Chapter 7 while all efficient failing firms file under Chapter 11 and have
the opportunity to be saved."t
Actually, the model has other equilibria which lie somewhere between
the perfect filtering and filtering failure equilibria. For example, suppose
the probability that failing firms are efficient falls to 0.45. Then creditors
would be indifferent between accepting and rejecting low payment plans
since their expected return under both strategies is 1.9. Suppose they play
mixed strategies, which means that they accept or reject randomly. One
possibility is that creditors accept low payment plans with probability 0.6.
Then managers of efficient firms get 3 if they offer high payment plans,
compared to an expected return of 0.6(4) + 0.4(2), or 3.2, if they offer low
payment plans. Similarly, managers of inefficient firms get 1 if they
choose Chapter 7, compared to an expected return of 0.6(2) + 0.4(0.5), or
1.4, if they offer low payment plans under Chapter 11. Thus, managers of
both types of firms still offer only low payment plans under Chapter 11.
In this case the equilibrium involves imperfect filtering since all failing
firms file under Chapter 11 and offer low payment plans, but creditors
reject 40% of these plans. Since the rejection of a reorganization plan
leads to the firm's type being revealed, this means that 40% of inefficient
firms liquidate and only 60% of inefficient firms successfully reorganize.
Other possible imperfect filtering equilibria involve managers of
inefficient or efficient firms (or both) playing mixed strategies-i.e.,
randomly choosing between offering low payment plans under Chapter 11
or pursuing their other strategies-and creditors also playing mixed
strategies. Imperfect filtering equilibria are intermediate in economic
efficiency between filtering failure and perfect filtering. This is because
10. A pooling equilibrium cannot occur since the low payment amount must be greater than 2.2,
but also must be less than 2. See infra note 15.
[VOL. 72:1319
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under imperfect filtering some inefficient failing firms liquidate, but others
file under Chapter 11 and either succeed in reorganizing or fail to
reorganize but delay shutting down until managers' plan is rejected."
Although the model is fairly stylized, it incorporates many of the
important features of U.S. bankruptcy law. The model captures the fact
that managers of failing firms can choose to file under Chapter 11 and that
they have the exclusive right to propose the first reorganization plan. It
also captures managers' ability to control the flow of information
concerning the firm during at least the initial period of reorganization. The
assumption that information about the firm's type is revealed if managers'
plan is rejected reflects the fact that firms in Chapter 11 are often offered
for sale on the open market if a reorganization plan is not adopted. The
model reflects the fact that managers have an incentive to delay offering
Chapter 11 reorganization plans as long as possible, because delay reduces
the payoff to creditors in Chapter 11 relative to Chapter 7 (see below).
Also, the model incorporates the effects of the various subsidies that firms
in reorganization receive from creditors and the government. Among the
important features of Chapter 11 that are ignored here is the fact that
creditors are diverse and are treated differently in reorganization depending
on their priority and whether they are secured.
Il1. A SIMULATION
The next step is to simulate the model. To do so, it is necessary to
move from examples involving specific payoffs to more general conditions
that define when a particular type of equilibrium occurs. To keep the
simulation simple, I focus on the (complete) filtering failure equilibrium in
which all managers of both firm types offer low payment plans under
Chapter 11 and creditors always accept these plans. The object of the
simulation is to establish whether this equilibrium is likely to occur under
real world conditions. If the conditions for filtering failure do not hold,
then perfect filtering is likely to occur.2
11. See White, Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 1, for further discussion of the various equilibria
in the model.
12. Since there are several imperfect filtering equilibria, failure to meet the conditions for the
filtering failure equilibrium could imply that one of the imperfect filtering equilibria holds rather than
the perfect filtering equilibrium. However, the conditions for the imperfect filtering equilibria are more
specialized and less likely to hold than the conditions for either perfect filtering or filtering failure.
Therefore, if filtering failure does not occur, then perfect filtering is likely to occur. See White,
Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note I, for further discussion.
1994] 1327
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A. Conditions for Filtering Failure
There are three conditions that are required for the filtering failure
equilibrium to hold, one for each set of players. First, creditors must
accept all low payment reorganization plans. Suppose the amount that
creditors receive if they accept low payment plans is denoted PL. Now
consider what creditors receive if they reject low payment plans. In that
case the firm is offered for sale as a going concern on the open market. If
it turns out to be inefficient, then it is sold for an amount L. Transactions
costs are C1. (The subscript I indicates liquidation under Chapter 7.)
Creditors receive the proceeds of sale net of costs, or L - C1. Assume that
PL > L - C. If the firm turns out to be efficient, then either it may be sold
as a going concern or a creditor may propose a second reorganization plan
which is accepted. In either case, suppose creditors receive the same
payoff that they would have received if managers had chosen to offer a
high payment reorganization plan. This amount is denoted PH, where PH
> PL. Suppose the probability that failing firms are efficient is denoted y.
Creditors' expected return when they reject low payment reorganization
plans is 'yPH + (1 - 7)(L - C). For creditors to accept all low payment
plans, they must receive more when they accept these plans than their
expected return if they reject, or:
PL > YPH + (1 - y)(L -C,) (1)
The second condition needed for the filtering failure equilibrium to hold
is that managers of efficient firms must always choose to offer low
payment plans. Assuming that creditors always accept these plans, the cost
to managers of offering low payment reorganization plans is PL. Managers'
alternative is to offer high payment plans with a cost to managers of PH.
Therefore, the condition for managers to offer low payment reorganization
plans, assuming that creditors always accept, is:
PL < (2)
The third condition necessary for the filtering failure equilibrium to hold
is that managers of inefficient firms must always choose to offer low
payment reorganization plans. Since managers know that creditors always
accept these plans, this condition requires that managers be better off when
they file under Chapter 11 and their low payment plans are accepted than
when they remain out of bankruptcy as long as possible and file eventually
under Chapter 7. Suppose inefficient firms' revenues from the time
managers make their strategy decision until the firm closes down after
[VOL. 72:1319
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reorganizing in Chapter 11 are R,. (The r subscript indicates reorganization
under Chapter 11.) Also suppose inefficient firms' revenues from the time
managers make their strategy decision until the firm closes down after
remaining outside of bankruptcy are R,. The magnitudes of Rr and R, are
affected by the length of time that inefficient failing firms continue to
operate when they file under Chapter 11, or when they avoid Chapter 11.
Rr is likely to be greater than R,, since the subsidies to firms in Chapter 11
probably allow these firms to remain in operation longer. However, firms
filing under Chapter 11 must pay transactions costs of Cr and they must
pay creditors PL under the reorganization plan. Thus, when inefficient
failing firms offer low payment reorganization plans and creditors accept,
the firms' net revenues are Rr - Cr - PL-
Managers of inefficient firms that remain outside of bankruptcy may also
make payments to certain creditors, although they probably do not pay
most of their creditors. Those creditors that are paid presumably have
collateral interests in assets of the firm that are necessary for its continued
operation and would, if not paid, cause the firm to shut down prematurely.
The amount of payments to creditors by firms remaining outside of
bankruptcy and filing eventually under Chapter 7 is denoted E,.3
Therefore, the net revenues of inefficient firms when managers choose
Chapter 7 are R, - El. Suppose managers of inefficient firms choose their
strategy to maximize the value of the firms' net revenues. Then the
condition for managers to offer low payment reorganization plans,
assuming that creditors always accept these plans, is:
R- Cr-PL> RI-E (3)
Expression (3) also shows that the longer managers delay before offering
low payment reorganization plans, the more likely they are to offer these
plans. Delaying offering a plan lowers the value of PL relative to the other
terms in (3), since PL is paid only after managers offer and creditors accept
these plans. Therefore, the longer managers can delay, the lower is PL and
the more likely that the inequality in (3) holds. 4
13. The value El includes payments to creditors made both before and after the firm files under
Chapter 7, although data suggest that the latter are extremely small for firms filing under Chapter 7.
See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Liquidation and Reorganization, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN
FINANCE (Dennis Logue ed., 2d ed. 1990).
14. Different payments in the model occur at different times, so that to be precise, all payments
should be defined in terms of their present value at a particular time. For example, C, is paid when
firms file under Chapter 11, E, is paid before firms file under Chapter 7, and PL is paid after a low
payment reorganization plan has been adopted. Thus, the longer managers delay before offering a plan,
1329
Washington University Open Scholarship
1330 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Another version of expression (3) is (Rr - RI) + (El - PL) > C,. The
quantity (R,. - R,) is the increase in the firm's future revenues when it files
under Chapter 11 rather than under Chapter 7, including the effect of
government subsidies to firms in Chapter 11. The quantity (E, - PL) is the
net subsidy from creditors to firms in Chapter 11, or the difference between
the amount that inefficient firms pay creditors in Chapter 7 versus Chapter
11. The expression implies that in order for managers of inefficient firms
to choose Chapter 11, either the increase in the firm's future revenues or
the net subsidy from creditors-but not both-must be positive. The two
terms together must be greater than the transaction costs of reorganizing,
C1.
If we solve inequalities (1), (2), and (3) for PL and put them together, we
get the following condition defining when the filtering failure equilibrium
occurs:
YPH + (1 - y)(L - C) < PL < min[PH, (Rr - R) - C,. + E] (4)
Suppose we treat all the variables here as being exogenously determined,
except PL. Then filtering failure occurs as long as YPH + (1 - y)(L - C) <
min[PH, (Rr - RI) - C + E], so that some range of values of PL exists which
satisfies the conditions in (4).'
Now suppose we divide all of the dollar values in (4) by the firm's total
liabilities to creditors. The resulting variables are denoted with asterisks.
Inequality (4) then becomes:
yP; + (I - y)(L - Ct)* < PL < min[P;, (Rr - Rt)* - , + E*t] (5)
I follow the procedure.of adopting values for all of the variables in (5)
except P:. I then examine whether filtering failure occurs at the assumed
parameter values, i.e., whether there is some range of values of P for
which (5) is satisfied. Then to check for sensitivity of the results to
particular assumptions, I vary each parameter value individually to
determine whether the filtering failure equilibrium still holds.
the more PL decreases in present value relative to the other terms in (3).
Note also that while there is a transactions cost of liquidating, C, it does not affect the strategy of
managers of inefficient firms since it is not paid until after managers are displaced.
15. Since managers ofinefficient firms were assumed always to prefer filing under Chapter 7 over
offering high payment plans under Chapter 11, it must be the case that R, - C, - Pit < R, - El, or P, >
(R, - C,) - (R, - E). In the example in Figure 1, P, = 3, R, - El = 1, and R, - C,. - PL = 2. Substituting
these values into the inequality, we find that PL < 2. Thus, the pooling equilibrium in the example
occurs as long as 1.8 < PL < 2.
[VOL. 72:1319
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B. Base Case Values
Values must be adopted for P, (L - C)*, (Rr - Rt)*, C*, E;, and y. Since
the characteristics of small versus large firms in bankruptcy are quite
different, I adopt separate values for each.
Consider first the transaction costs of filing under Chapter 11 as a
proportion of total liabilities, C*r. Several studies have found it to be
around 0.03.16 I use this value for both large and small firms. P is the
high payment rate to creditors of firms in reorganization and is also
assumed to equal the amount that creditors receive if they reject a low
payment plan and the firm is revealed to be efficient. To establish a
ballpark value of PL, I divide Weiss' sample of large firms that filed under
Chapter 1117 into upper and lower halves based on their payoff rates to
unsecured creditors.'" The mean payoff rate for firms in the top half of
the sample is about 0.80. For small firms, I follow the same procedure
using LoPucki's sample of small firms that filed under Chapter 1119 and
obtain a figure for the upper half of approximately 0.40. I therefore use
0.80 and 0.40 as the base case values of PL for large and small firms,
respectively.
Turn now to the value of (L - Ct)*, the amount paid to creditors if a firm
in reorganization is liquidated after creditors reject managers' reorganiza-
tion plan. In White's sample of small firms in bankruptcy, a number of
firms filed under Chapter 11 but did not adopt reorganization plans and
were sold as going concerns while remaining in Chapter 11. The average
payoff rate to creditors of these firms was 0.13.2 Since large firms are
rarely observed to liquidate, little data is available for them. I therefore
assume that (L - Ct)* equals 0.13 for both large and small firms.2
16. See Karen H. Wruck, Financial Distress, Reorganization and Organizational Efficiency, 27
J. FIN. ECON. 419 (1990), for a survey of the evidence.
17. Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims,
27 J. FIN. EcON. 285 (1990).
18. Id. at 295.
19. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter I of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Ami. BANKR. L.J. 99, 99-126,247-73 (1983). The top half of firms in LoPucki's
sample all promised payment rates of 100%, but without interest and with payout periods of up to 14
years. Id. at 125. To take account of both risk and high nominal interest rates during his sample period
(the early 1980s), I discounted the promised payments using a discount rate of 0.20.
20. White, supra note 13, at 37-41.
21. A recent example of a large firm that filed under Chapter I1 but eventually liquidated is
Eastern Airlines, which paid nothing to unsecured creditors. See Lawrence A. Weiss, Restructuring
Complications in Bankruptcy, The Eastern Airlines Bankruptcy Case (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
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Consider next the difference between the revenues of inefficient firms
that reorganize, rather than liquidate, as a proportion of total liabilities, or
(Rr - R,)*. This difference includes both government subsidies to firms that
file under Chapter 11 and increases in the revenues of inefficient firms that
file under Chapter 11 since they remain in operation longer. Turn first to
government subsidies. They have two main components. First, failing
firms may transfer their pension plans to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), a government agency. The right to do so constitutes
a subsidy since these plans are often underfunded.22 Second, firms in
Chapter 11 also receive various tax benefits, including (subject to a number
of conditions) the right to keep their accumulated net operating loss (NOL)
carryforwards and investment tax credit (ITC) carryforwards, and to avoid
liability for taxes on cancellation of indebtedness under the reorganization
plan.' The value of these subsidies depends on the likelihood that firms
will make profits in the future.
To investigate the importance of these subsidies, I obtained data from
Compustat on unfunded vested pension liabilities, NOL carryforwards, ITC
carryforwards, and total liabilities for 943 public firms that filed for
bankruptcy between 1980 and 1990. Since data for many firms is not
reported or is misleading during the period close to the firm's bankruptcy
filing, I obtained data for each firm for the year of bankruptcy and the four
years prior to filing. Consider unfunded vested pension liabilities first.
Only 75 firms, or 8%, reported positive unfunded vested pension liabilities
in either the year of bankruptcy or any of the four prior years. (The others
either reported having no unfunded vested pension liabilities or did not
report at all.) For firms that reported these liabilities, I calculated the ratio
of unfunded vested pension liabilities to total liabilities for each year for
which nonzero values were reported. I then calculated an average figure,
weighting each firm equally regardless of how frequently it reported data.
The resulting average ratio of unfunded vested pension liabilities to total
liabilities was 0.67. Thus, the proportion of bankrupt firms that benefit
from transferring their pension plans to the PBGC is low, but a few firms
on file with author).
22. Pension funds are also transferred to the PBGC when firms file under Chapter 7, but in that
case managers do not benefit.
23. Firms that file under Chapter 7 lose these benefits completely. However, some of the tax
benefits are available to firms that are in financial difficulty but have not filed for bankruptcy. See
Stuart C. Gilson, Debt Reductions, Optimal Capital Structure, and Renegotiation of Claims During
Financial Distress (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly).
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benefit enormously. The expected benefit per firm in bankruptcy from
transferring unfunded vested pension liabilities to the PBGC is (0.08)(0.67)
= 0.05 as a proportion of total liabilities.24
Now consider NOL carryforwards. Firms that file for bankruptcy are
much more likely to report NOL carryforwards than unfunded vested
pension liabilities: about 70% of public firms in bankruptcy report positive
NOL carryforwards. For firms that report positive NOL carryforwards, I
calculated the ratio of NOL carryforwards to total liabilities for the year in
which the firm filed for bankruptcy. The average ratio was 1.20. If these
carryforwards were all used immediately, they would be worth (1.2)(0.34)
or 41% of total liabilities, where 0.34 is the corporate profits tax rate.
However, firms use their NOL carryforwards only after some delay and
firms in Chapter 11 may never use them at all. Altschuler and Auerbach
found that the average tax rate on firms making losses is 45% of the
statutory tax rate.2 Therefore, the expected value of the subsidy implied
by firms in Chapter 11 retaining their NOL carryforwards is
(0.70)(1.2)(0.34)(0.45), or 13% of total liabilities.26 I also calculated the
expected value of the subsidy implied by firms in Chapter 11 retaining their
ITC carryforwards, but it turned out to be extremely small.
These figures suggest that while government subsidies to firms in
Chapter 11 are important for some firms, they are fairly unimportant for the
average firm in bankruptcy. However, government subsidies are only one
component of (R, - R,)*, which also includes increased revenues from
inefficient firms remaining in operation when they file under Chapter 11.
Combining these, I therefore assume that the base case value of (R. - Rt)*
is 0.36 for large firms and 0.13 for small firms. The base case figure of
0.36 for large firms is about double the value of the two government
subsidies together. The base case figure of 0.13 for small firms is assumed
to equal just the average tax subsidy to firms in bankruptcy, since these
24. The firm with the largest ratio of unfunded vested pension liabilities to total liabili-
ties-52.2-was Mesta Machinery Company. Recent examples of firms that filed for bankruptcy and
transferred large unfunded pension liabilities to the PBGC include Pan American World Airways and
the LTV Corporation, with $900 million and $1.7 billion in unfunded pension liabilities, respectively.
See Thomas C. Hayes, LTV's Creditors Support Bankruptcy Exit, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 15, 1992, at 37, col.
3.
25. Rosanne Altschuler & Alan J. Auerbach, The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An
Empirical Investigation, 105 Q.J. ECON. 61, 70-75 (1990).
26. The firm with the largest ratio of NOL earryforwards to total liabilities was Century Oil and
Gas, with a ratio of 48.0.
27. The average ratio of ITC carryforwards to total liabilities was .00005.
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firms are not likely to have unvested pension liabilities and probably
receive little gain in terms of remaining in operation longer.
There is virtually no data available to guide the choice of E, the amount
that managers of inefficient firms pay creditors outside of bankruptcy as a
proportion of total liabilities. I assume that creditors of large firms monitor
more carefully and therefore receive more outside of bankruptcy. Thus, as
a base case assumption, I assume that E*, equals 0.30 for large firms and E;
equals 0.12 for small firms.
For y, the proportion of failing firms that are economically efficient,
there is no direct evidence available due to the difficulty of observing
whether failing firms are economically efficient or inefficient. However,
several recent surveys of small firms in Chapter 11 suggest that about one-
quarter of them adopt reorganization plans and emerge from Chapter 11 28
Yet, many of the firms that emerge from Chapter 11 fail to make the
payments to creditors that are specified under their plans.29 I therefore
assume that the base case value of y is 0.17 for small firms. For large
public firms, a much higher proportion of firms adopt reorganization plans,
but the adoption of a plan by itself provides less evidence that the firm is
economically efficient. (Adoption of a plan merely provides evidence that
the firm has some valuable assets.) I assume that a higher proportion of
large public firms that file under Chapter 11 are economically efficient, so
that the base case value of y equals 0.50.o3 The base case values for large
and small firms are listed at the top of Tables 1 and 2.
C. Results
Many of these parameter values are obviously quite speculative and,
therefore, the simulation should be interpreted as suggestive only. As
further empirical research on bankrupt firms occurs, better data can be used
to refine the analysis.
28. LoPucki, supra note 19, at 100.
29. Id. at 126.
30. Evidence concerning small firms in bankruptcy comes from White, supra note 13; LoPucki,
supra note 19; Flynn, supra note 2; and Jensen-Cocklin, supra note 2. For a summary of survey
evidence concerning firms in bankruptcy, see Michelle J. White, Survey Evidence on Business
Bankruptcy, in BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Jagdeep S. Bhandari ed.,
forthcoming 1995).
[VOL. 72:1319
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/34
1994] ECONOMICALLY INEFFICIENT FIRMS IN CHAPTER 11
Table 1:
Simulation Results for Large Firms
Base case values for large firms:
P = .8, (L - Cj)* = .13, C = .03, E = .3, (R, - Rl)* = .36, y = .50
Base case
P, > 1.13
P;1 = 1.0
P, = .30
7 > .75
7 = .75
7 = .10
y = 0
C,)* > .45
Cj)' = .45
c,)" = .25
c,)" = 0
E, + (R, - Rl)* = .90
+ (R,. - R)*= .76
+ (R, R) = .50
E, + (R, - R,)* < .50
Filtering failure
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
Range for P;
.47 - .63
.57 - .63
.22 - .63
.63
.20 - .63
.13 - .63
.63
.53 - .63
.40 - .63
.46 - .80
.46 - .73
.46
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Table 2:
Simulation Results for Small Firms
Base case values for small firms:
P = .4, (L - C,)" = .13, C' = .03, E-1 = .12, (Rr - Rl)" = .13, ? .17
Filtering failure
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
Range for P;
.18 - .22
.22
.13
.21 - .22
.16- .22
.13 - .22
.22
.07 - .22
.18 - .40
.18
Base case
P; > .65
Pk = .65
p; = .13
P; < .13
y > .35
y = .30
y = .10
y=0
(L - C)" > .18
(L - C,)= .18
(L - C,) = 0
E+ (R, - R)* = .50
E+ (R, - R)* = .21
E*t + (R, - R)* < .21
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With these caveats, turn to the results in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports
the results for large firms. The base case outcome is shown in the first line
of the table. It indicates that the conditions for filtering failure are satisfied
at the base case values as long as P: is within the range 0.47 to 0.63. Now
suppose that PL changes, while all other parameters remain at their base
case values. Filtering failure still occurs if P rises as high as 1.13
(implying that creditors receive more than they are owed). If Pt equals
1.0, then the range of values of PL consistent with filtering failure is 0.57
to 0.63. The conditions for filtering failure are also satisfied at much lower
values of P . If P equals 0.30, then the range of possible values of P is
0.22 to 0.63. Lower values of PL cause the range of values of P: that is
consistent with filtering failure to shift downward, so that it becomes more
attractive for managers of inefficient firms to file under Chapter 11 and,
therefore, filtering failure is more likely to occur.
Next suppose the value of 7 changes. The conditions for filtering failure
are still satisfied if 7 takes values up to 0.75 or as low as zero. Reductions
in the value of 7 make it more likely that filtering failure occurs, because
creditors prefer to accept rather than reject low payment reorganization
plans as the probability that the firms offering them are inefficient rises.
At 7 = 0, the range of possible values of P: is wide-0.13 to 0.63.
The next lines in the tables show the effect of variation in (L - Cl)*.
Complete filtering failure occurs if (L - C)* takes values as high as 0.45,
in which case P must equal 0.63, or as low as 0, in which case PL can take
any value in the range 0.40 to 0.63. However, values of (L - C1) greater
than 0.45 are inconsistent with the complete filtering failure equilibrium.
As (L - C)* rises, it becomes more attractive for creditors to reject low
payment reorganization plans since the worst outcome for them if they
reject is not so bad. Thus, the filtering failure equilibrium is less likely to
hold at higher values of (L - C)*.
Now turn to variations in E* and (Rr - R,)*. These two terms enter the
simulation additively (see the inequalities in (4)), so that the effect of
increasing or decreasing either of them by a uniform amount is the
same.3' The base case value of El + (R, - R,)* is 0.30 + 0.36, or 0.66.
Complete filtering failure still occurs as E + (Rr - R,)* rises. For example,
if E + (R. - R,)* rises from 0.66 to 0.90, then complete filtering failure still
occurs and the range of possible values of P: is 0.46 to 0.80. Higher
31. The same is also true of C', except that its sign is reversed. Thus, increasing E, or (R, - R,)*
has the same effect on the outcome as decreasing C, by the same amount.
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government subsidies in Chapter 11 and/or higher payments to creditors
outside of bankruptcy make it more attractive for managers of inefficient
firms to file under Chapter 11. Therefore, complete filtering failure is more
likely to occur. But if E;j + (R, - R,)" falls, then filtering failure is less
likely to occur. If managers of inefficient firms can pay relatively little to
creditors outside of bankruptcy or if the subsidies they receive in Chapter
11 fall, then it becomes more attractive for them to remain outside of
bankruptcy and to file eventually under Chapter 7. If E; + (Rr - R,)* falls
to 0.50, then the conditions for filtering failure are still satisfied as long as
P equals 0.46. However, the conditions for filtering failure break down
if El + (Rr - R,)* falls below 0.50. The simulation results are clearly
sensitive to the values of E*1 and (R, - R)*--the parameters about which we
know the least.
Table 2 gives results of the same simulation procedure using the base
case values for small firms. Here the conditions for the filtering failure
equilibrium are again satisfied at the base case values, as long as PL is in
the range of 0.18 to 0.22. Varying P , filtering failure still occurs if P,
rises as high as 0.65 or falls as low as 0.13. It also still occurs if the
proportion of firms that are efficient, y, falls as low as zero or rises as high
as 0.35. Filtering failure still occurs if the liquidation value of inefficient
firms, (L - C,)*, falls to zero or rises as high as 0.18. Finally, the combined
value of E, + (R, - R,)* is 0.25 in the base case. The sum El + (Rr - Rt)*
may fall as low as 0.21 or rise as high as 0.50 or more and the conditions
for filtering failure are still satisfied. Thus, filtering failure also may occur
for small firms in bankruptcy within fairly wide ranges of the parameter
values.
Another interesting result of the simulation is that creditors in reorganiza-
tion tend to receive substantially more than the liquidation value of the
firm's assets, i.e., Pj is well above (L - C,)' even when P[ is assumed to
take the minimum value within its range. This result supports several
recent theoretical models of the bargaining process in Chapter 11 which
imply that creditors receive more in Chapter 11 than they would get if the
firm liquidated under Chapter 7,32 even though the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
only gives creditors the right to receive in Chapter 11 what they would get
in Chapter 7.33
32. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of
Corporate Reorganization, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991); Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 5; Brown,
supra note 5.
33. I1 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
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The simulation results thus suggest that complete filtering failure may
occur in bankruptcy under a wide range of parameter values and that it may
occur both for large and small firms in bankruptcy. The efficiency losses
associated with Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization may therefore be
quite large.
IV. CONCLUSION
The model in this paper suggests a new explanation for why things go
wrong in Chapter 11. In the model, there are two types of firms in
financial distress: those that should liquidate because they are economically
inefficient and those that should remain in operation because they are
economically efficient. I assume that it is difficult for outsiders such as
creditors to identify individual firms' types. Under an ideal bankruptcy
policy, all failing firms that are economically efficient, and therefore worth
saving, would file under Chapter 11 and have an opportunity to be saved,
while all failing firms that are economically inefficient would file and be
liquidated under Chapter 7. However, the model shows that in fact both
efficient and inefficient failing firms may file under Chapter 11 and both
may successfully reorganize. This wastes resources, since reorganizing
inefficient firms delays their shutdown and delays the movement of
resources to new and more valuable uses. It thus contributes to economic
stagnation. The paper suggests a new reason for why the two-track
bankruptcy procedure in the United States needs rethinking and provides
a justification for reform proposals that would reduce managers' control
over the reorganization process.34
The model also suggests one specific reform that would improve
efficiency by reducing the probability that economically inefficient firms
reorganize. Under the reform, whenever creditors rejected a low payment
reorganization plan, firms would be sold on the open market in Chapter 11.
This change would encourage the market for bankrupt firms to become
34. Many reform proposals have been put forward. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt:
A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983); Douglas G. Baird, The
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A
New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Philippe Aghion
et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1994).
See White, Comparison, supra note 1, for a discussion of bankruptcy law in the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. In all three countries, managers of firms in bankruptcy are displaced and an
official appointed by the bankruptcy court makes the decision whether to liquidate or to reorganize
firms in bankruptcy.
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more active, which would cause values to rise. But if the value of assets
of failing firms sold on the open market rose, then creditors would be less
likely to accept low payment reorganization plans because their expected
payoff if they rejected these plans would be higher. As a result, managers
of inefficient firms would find it less attractive to file under Chapter 11 in
the first place, and the inefficient filtering failure equilibrium would then
be less likely to occur.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/34
